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a b s t r a c t
Much of science is (rightly or wrongly) driven by hypothesis testing. Even in situations where the hy-
pothesis testing paradigm is correct, the common practice of basing inferences solely on p-values has
been under intense criticism for over 50 years. We propose, as an alternative, the use of the odds of a
correct rejection of the null hypothesis to incorrect rejection. Both pre-experimental versions (involving
the power and Type I error) and post-experimental versions (depending on the actual data) are consid-
ered. Implementations are provided that range fromdepending only on the p-value to consideration of full
Bayesian analysis. A surprise is that all implementations – even the full Bayesian analysis – have complete
frequentist justification. Versions of our proposal can be implemented that require only minor modifica-
tions to existing practices yet overcome some of their most severe shortcomings.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In recent years, many sciences – including experimental
psychology – have been embarrassed by a growing number of re-
ports that many findings do not replicate. While a variety of fac-
tors contribute to this state of affairs, a major part of the problem
is that conventional statistical methods, when applied to standard
research designs in psychology and many other sciences, are too
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intentionally high rate of false positives. A number of alternative
statistical methods have been proposed, including several in this
special issue, and we are sympathetic to many of these propos-
als. In particular we are highly sympathetic to efforts to wean the
scientific community away from an over-reliance on hypothesis
testing, with utilization of often-more-relevant estimation and
prediction techniques.
Our goal in this paper is more modest in scope: we propose
a range of modifications – several relatively minor – to existing
statistical practice in hypothesis testing that we believe would
immediately fix some of the most severe shortcomings of cur-
rent methodology. Theminor modifications would not require any
changes in the statistical tests that are commonly used, and would
rely only on the most basic statistical concepts and tools, such
as significance thresholds, p-values, and statistical power. With
p-values and power calculations in hand (obtained from standard
le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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mend can be carried out with a calculator.
In developing and justifying these simple modifications of
standard methods, we also discuss additional tools that are
available from Bayesian statistics. While these can provide
considerable additional benefit in a number of settings, significant
improvements in the testing paradigm can be made even without
them.
We study the standard setting of precise hypothesis testing.1
We can observe data x from the density f (x | θ). We consider
testing
H0 : θ = θ0 versus H1 : θ ≠ θ0. (1)
Our proposed approach to hypothesis testing is based on consid-
eration of the odds of correct rejection of H0 to incorrect rejection.
This ‘rejection odds’ approach has a dual frequentist/Bayesian in-
terpretation, and it addresses four acknowledged problems with
common practices of statistical testing:
1. Failure to incorporate considerations of power into the
interpretation of the evidence.
2. Failure to incorporate considerations of prior probability into
the design of the experiment.
3. Temptation to misinterpret p-values in ways that lead to
overstating the evidence against the null hypothesis and in
favor of the alternative hypothesis.
4. Having optional stopping present in the design or running of the
experiment, but ignoring the stopping rule in the analysis.
There are a host of other problems involving testing, such as
the fact that the size of an effect is often much more important
thanwhether an effect exists, but herewe only focus on the testing
problem itself. Our proposal – developed throughout the paper
and summarized in the conclusion – is that researchers should
report what we call the ‘pre-experimental rejection ratio’ when
presenting their experimental design, and researchers should
report what we call the ‘post-experimental rejection ratio’ (or
Bayes factor) when presenting their experimental results.
In Section 2,we take a pre-experimental perspective: for a given
anticipated effect size and sample size, we discuss the evidentiary
impact of statistical significance, and we consider the problem of
choosing the significance threshold (the region of results that will
lead us to reject H0). The (pre-experimental) ‘rejection ratio’ Rpre,
the ratio of statistical power to significance threshold (i.e., the ratio
of the probability of rejecting under H1 and H0, respectively), is
shown to capture the strength of evidence in the experiment for
H1 over H0; its use addresses Problem #1 above.
How much a researcher should believe in H1 over H0 depends
not only on the rejection ratio but also on the prior odds, the
relative prior probability of H1 to H0. The ‘pre-experimental
rejection odds,’ which is the overall odds in favor of H1 implied by
rejectingH0, is the product of the rejection ratio and the prior odds.
When the prior odds in favor ofH1 are low, the rejection ratio need
1 By precise hypothesis testing, we mean that H0 is a lower dimensional subspace
of H1 , as in (1). In particular, the major problemwith p-values that is highlighted in
this paper is muted if the hypotheses are, say, H0 : θ < 0 versus H1 : θ > 0. As
an example, suppose θ denotes the difference in mean treatment effects for cancer
treatments A and B:
• Scenario 1: Treatment A= standard chemotherapy and Treatment B= standard
chemotherapy + steroids. This is a scenario of precise hypothesis testing,
because steroids could be essentially ineffective against cancer, so that θ could
quite plausibly be essentially zero.
• Scenario 2: Treatment A = standard chemotherapy and Treatment B = a new
radiation therapy. In this case there is no reason to think that θ could be zero,
and it would be more appropriate to test H0 : θ < 0 versus H1 : θ > 0.
See Berger and Mortera (1999) for discussion of these issues.to be greater in order for the experiment to be equally convincing.
This line of reasoning, which addresses Problem #2, implies that
researchers should adopt more stringent significance thresholds
(and generally use larger sample sizes) when demonstrating
surprising, counterintuitive effects. The logic underlying the pre-
experimental odds suggests that the standard approach in many
sciences (including experimental psychology) – accepting H1
whenever H0 is rejected at a conventional 0.05 significance
threshold – can lead to especially misleading conclusions when
power is low or the prior odds is low.
In Section 3, we turn to a post-experimental perspective: once
the experimental analysis is completed, how strong is the evidence
implied by the observed data? The analog of the pre-experimental
odds is the ‘post-experimental odds’: the prior odds times the
Bayes factor. The Bayes factor is the ratio of the likelihood of the
observed data under H1 to its likelihood under H0; for consistency
in notation (and because of a surprising frequentist interpretation
that is observed for this ratio), we will often refer to the Bayes
factor as the ‘post-experimental rejection ratio,’ Rpost .
Common misinterpretations of the observed p-value (Problem
#3) are that it somehow reflects the error probability in rejecting
H0 (see Berger, 2003; Berger, Brown, & Wolpert, 1994) or the
related notion that it reflects the likelihood of the observed data
under H0. Both are very wrong. For example, it is sometimes
incorrectly said that p = 0.05 means that there was only a 5%
chance of observing the data under H0. (The correct statement is
that p = 0.05 means that there was only a 5% chance of observing
a test statistic as extreme or more extreme as its observed value
underH0 – but this correct statement is not very useful becausewe
want to know how strong the evidence is, given that we actually
observed the value of the test statistic that we did.) Given this
misinterpretation, many researchers dramatically overestimate
the strength of the experimental evidence for H1 provided by a p-
value. The Bayes factor has a straightforward interpretation as the
strength of the evidence in favor of H1 relative to H0, and thus its
use can avoid themisinterpretations that arise from reliance on the
p-value.
The Bayes factor approach has been resisted by many scientists
because of two perceived obstacles. First, determination of Bayes
factors can be difficult. Second, many are uneasy about the
subjective components of Bayesian inference, and view the familiar
frequentist justification of inference to be much more comforting.
The first issue is addressed in Section 3.2, where we discuss the
‘Bayes factor bound’ 1/[−ep log p] (from Sellke, Bayarri, & Berger,
2001 andVovk, 1993). This bound is the largest Bayes factor in favor
of H1 that is possible (under reasonable assumptions). The Bayes
factor bound can thus be interpreted as a best-case scenario for
the strength of the evidence in favor of H1 that can arise from a
given p-value. Even though it favors H1 amongst all (reasonable)
Bayesian procedures, it leads to far more conservative conclusions
than the usual misinterpretation of p-values; for example, a
p-value of 0.05 only represents at most 2.5 : 1 evidence in favor
of H1. The ‘post-experimental odds bound’ can then be calculated
as the Bayes factor bound times the prior odds.
In Section 3.3, we address the frequentist concerns about the
Bayes factor. In fact, we show that in our setting, using the Bayes
factor is actually a fully frequentist procedure – and, indeed, we
argue that it is actually a much better frequentist procedure than
that based on the p-value or on the pre-experimental rejection
ratio. Our result that the Bayes factor has a frequentist justification
is novel to this paper, and it is surprising because the Bayes factor
depends on the prior distribution for the effect size under H1.
We point out the resolution to this apparent puzzle: the prior
distribution’s role is to prioritize where to maximize power, while
the procedure always maintains frequentist error control for the
rejection ratio that is analogous to Type I frequentist error control.
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factor helps to unify the pre-experimental odds with the post-
experimental odds. It also provides a bridge between frequentist
and Bayesian approaches to hypothesis testing.
In Section 4, we address the practical question of how to
choose the priors that enter into the calculation of the Bayes factor
and post-experimental odds. We enumerate a range of options.
Researchersmay prefer one or another of these options, depending
on whether or not they are comfortable with statistical modeling,
and whether or not they are willing to adopt priors that are
subjective. Since the options cover many situations, we argue that
there is really no practical barrier to reporting the Bayes factor,
or at least the Bayes factor bound. For example, reporting the
Bayes factor bound does not require specifying any prior, and
it is simple to calculate from just the p-value associated with
standard hypothesis tests. While the Bayes factor bound is not
ideal as a summary of the evidence since it is biased against the
null, we believe its reporting would still lead to more accurate
interpretations of the evidence than reporting the p-value alone.
In Section 5, we show that the post-experimental odds
approach has the additional advantage that it overcomes the
problems that afflict p-values caused by optional stopping in data
collection. A common practice is to collect some data, analyze it,
and then collect more data if the results are not yet statistically
significant (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012). There is nothing
inherently wrong with such an optional stopping strategy; indeed,
it is a sensible procedure when there are competing demands
on a limited subject pool. However, in the presence of optional
stopping, it is well-known that p-values calculated in the usual
way can be extremely biased (e.g., Anscombe, 1954). Under the
null hypothesis, there is a greater than 5% chance of a statistically
significant result when there is more than one opportunity to get
lucky. (Indeed, if scientists were given unlimited research money
and allowed to ignore optional stopping, theywould be guaranteed
to be able to reject any correct null hypothesis at any Type I
error level!) In contrast, the post-experimental odds approach we
recommend is not susceptible to biasing via optimal stopping (cf.
Berger, 1985 and Berger & Berry, 1988).
The reason that the post-experimental odds do not depend
on optional stopping is that the effect of optional stopping on
the likelihood of observing some realization of the data is a
multiplicative constant.When one considers the odds of onemodel
to another, this same constant is present in the likelihood of
each model, and hence it cancels when taking the ratio of the
likelihoods. Thus, the Bayesian interpretation of post-experimental
odds is unaffected by optional stopping. And since the post-
experimental odds have complete frequentist justification, the
frequentist who employs them can also ignore optional stopping.
In Section 6 we put forward our recommendations for statisti-
cal practice in testing. These recommendations can be boiled down
to two: researchers should report the pre-experimental rejection
ratio when presenting their experimental design, and researchers
should report the post-experimental rejection ratio when present-
ing their results. How exactly these recommendations should be
adoptedwill vary according to the standard practice in the science.
For some sciences there are nothing but p-values; for others, there
are also minimal power considerations; for some there are sophis-
ticated power considerations; and for some there are full blown
specifications of prior odds ratios and prior distributions. Our rec-
ommendations accommodate all.
Most of the ideas in this paper have precedents in prior work.
What we call the ‘pre-experimental rejection odds’ is nearly
identical to Wacholder et al.’s (2004) ‘false-positive reporting
probability,’ as further developed by Ioannidis (2005) and the
Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium (2007). The ‘post-
experimental rejection odds’ approach is known in the statisticsliterature as Bayesian hypothesis testing. For psychology research,
there have been advocates for Bayesian analysis in general (e.g.,
Kruschke, 2011) and for Bayesian hypothesis testing in particular
(e.g., Masson, 2011;Wagenmakers et al., in press). The Bayes factor
bound was introduced by Sellke et al. (2001) and Vovk (1993).
We view our contribution primarily as presenting these ideas to
the research community in a unified framework and in terms of
actionable changes in statistical practice. As noted above, however,
as far as we know, our frequentist justification for Bayes factors is a
new result and helps to unify the pre- and post-experimental odds
approaches.
2. The pre-experimental odds approach: incorporating the
anticipated effect size and prior odds into interpretation of
statistical significance
Rejecting the null hypothesis at the 0.05 significance threshold
is typically taken to be sufficient evidence to accept the alternative
hypothesis. Such reasoning, however, is erroneous for at least two
reasons.
First, what one should conclude from statistical significance
depends not only on the probability of statistical significance under
the null hypothesis – the significance threshold of 0.05 – but also
on the probability of statistical significance under the alternative
hypothesis – the power of the statistical test. Second, the prior
odds in favor of the alternative hypothesis is relevant for the
strength of evidence that should be required. In particular, if the
alternative hypothesis would have seemed very unlikely prior to
running the experiment, then stronger evidence should be needed
to accept it. This section develops amore accurate way to interpret
the evidentiary impact of statistical significance that takes into
account these two points.
2.1. Pre-experimental rejection odds: the correct way to combine type
I error and power
Recall that we are interested in testing the null hypothesis,
H0 : θ = 0, against the alternative hypothesis, H1 : θ ≠ 0. Both
standard frequentist and Bayesian approaches can be expressed
through choice of a prior density π(θ) of θ under H1. To a frequen-
tist, this prior distribution represents a ‘weight function’ for power
computation. Often, this weight function is chosen to be a point
mass at a particular anticipated effect size, i.e., the power is simply
evaluated at a fixed value of θ .
Given the test statistic for the planned analysis (for example,
the t-statistic), the rejection region R is the set of values for
the test statistic such that the null hypothesis is said to be
‘rejected’ and the finding is declared to be statistically significant.
The ‘significance threshold’ α (the Type I error probability) is the
probability under H0 that the test statistic falls in the rejection
region. In practice, the rejection region is determined by the choice
of the significance threshold, which is fixed, typically at α = 0.05.
Given the experimental design and planned analysis, the Type I
error probability α pins down a Type II error probability β(θ) for
each possible value of θ : the probability that the test statistic does
not fall in the rejection region when the parameter equals θ . The
average power is (1 − β¯) ≡  (1 − β(θ))π(θ)dθ (which, again,
could simply be the power evaluated at a chosen fixed effect size).
We want to know: if we run the experiment, what are the odds
of correct rejection of the null hypothesis to incorrect rejection?We
call this quantity the ‘pre-experimental rejection odds’ (sometimes
dropping the word ‘rejection’ for brevity). Given the definition
of the Type I error probability α, the probability of incorrectly
rejecting H0 is π0α, where π0 is the (prior) probability that H0 is
true. Given the definition of average power 1 − β¯ , the probability
of correctly rejecting H0 is π1(1 − β¯), where π1 = 1 − π0 is the
M.J. Bayarri et al. / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 72 (2016) 90–103 93(prior) probability thatH1 is true. The following definition takes the
odds that result from these quantities and slightly reorganizes the
terms to introduce key components of the odds.
Definition. The pre-experimental odds of correct to incorrect
rejection of the null hypothesis is
Opre = π1
π0
× (1− β¯)
α
(2)
≡ OP × Rpre (3)
≡ [prior odds of H1 to H0]
× [(pre-experimental) rejection ratio of H1 to H0].
An alternative definition of the pre-experimental odds provides
a Bayesian perspective: Opre could be defined as the odds of H1 to
H0 conditional on the finding being statistically significant: Opre ≡
Pr(H1|R)
Pr(H0|R) . Bayes’ Rule then implies that
Pr(H1|R)
Pr(H0|R) =
Pr(H1)
Pr(H0)
Pr(R|H1)
Pr(R|H0) =
π1
π0
× (1−β¯)
α
, as above. Of course, this would be the Bayesian answer
only if the information available was just that the null hypothesis
was rejected (i.e., p-value < α); as we will see, if the p-value is
known, the Bayesian answer will differ.
The fact that Opre arises as the product of the prior odds and
rejection ratio is scientifically useful, in that it separates prior
opinions about the hypotheses (which can greatly vary) from the
pre-experimental rejection ratio, Rpre, provided by the experiment;
this latter is the odds of rejecting the null hypothesis when H1 is
true to rejecting the null hypothesis when H0 is true.
Fig. 1 illustrates how the ratio of power to the significance
threshold (the rejection ratio) represents the evidentiary impact
of statistical significance. Under the null hypothesis H0 : θ =
0, the red curve shows the probability density function of the
estimated effectθ , assumed to have a normal distribution. The red
shaded region on the right tail shows the one-sided 5% significance
region. (We focus on the one-sided region merely to simplify the
figure.) The area of the red shaded region, which equals 0.05, is
the probability of observing a statistically significant result under
H0. The blue curve shows the probability density function of the
estimated effectθ under a point alternative hypothesis H1 : θ =
θ1 > 0. The area of the blue region plus the area of the red
region is the probability of observing a statistically significant
result under H1, which equals the level of statistical power. Their
ratio, red area + blue areared area = 1−β¯α , is the rejection ratio.
The rejection ratio takes into account the crucial role of power
in understanding the strength of evidence when rejecting the null
hypothesis, and does so in a simpleway, reducing the evidence to a
single number. Table 1 shows this crucial role. For example, in a low
powered study with power equal to only 0.25, α = 0.05 results in
rejection ratio of only 5 : 1,which hardly inspires confidence in the
rejection. Researchers certainly understand that calculating power
prior to running an experiment is valuable in order to evaluate
whether the experiment is sufficiently likely to ‘work’ to be worth
running in the first place. Once an effect is found to be statistically
significant, however, there is a common but faulty intuition that
statistical power is no longer relevant.2
Calculating the rejection ratio requires knowing the power of
the statistical test, which in turn requires specifying an anticipated
2 This line of reasoning – ‘if the evidence is unlikely under the null hypothesis,
then the evidence favors the alternative hypothesis’ – may be a version of
‘confirmatory bias’ (see, e.g., Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983, pp. 247–248). The
person making the judgment (in this case, the researcher) is considering only the
consistency or inconsistency of the evidence with respect to one of the hypotheses,
rather than with respect to both of the possible hypotheses.Fig. 1. The probability density of the observed effect under the null model (red
curve) and a point alternative (blue curve). The area of the red shaded region, which
equals 0.05, is the probability of observing a statistically significant result under
H0 . The area of the blue region plus the area of the red region is the probability
of observing a statistically significant result under H1 , which equals the level of
statistical power.
effect size or more generally a prior distribution over effect sizes
π(θ). Of course, choosing an anticipated effect size can be tricky
and sometimes controversial; see Gelman and Carlin (2014) for
some helpful discussion of how to use external information to
guide the choice. We advocate erring on the conservative side
(i.e., assuming ‘too small’ an effect size) because many of the
relevant biases in human judgment push in the direction of
assuming too large an effect size. For example, researchers may
be subject to a ‘focusing illusion’ (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998),
exaggerating the role of the hypothesized mechanism due to not
thinking about other mechanisms that also matter. As another
example, since obtaining a smaller sample size is usually less costly
than a larger sample size, researchers may wishfully convince
themselves that the effect size is large enough to justify the smaller
sample.
We also caution researchers against uncritically relying on
meta-analyses for determining the anticipated effect size. There
are three reasons. First, there may be publication bias in the
literature due to the well known ‘file drawer problem’ (Rosenthal,
1979): the experiments that did not find an effect may not be
published and thus may be omitted from the meta-analyses,
leading to an upward bias in the estimated effect size. Second
and relatedly, if experiments that find a significant effect are
more likely to be included in the analysis, then the estimated
effect size will be biased upward due to the ‘winner’s curse’ (e.g.,
Garner, 2007): conditional on statistical significance, the effect
estimate is biased away from zero (regardless of the true effect
size). Third and finally, if any of the studies included in the meta-
analysis adopted questionable research practices that inflate the
estimated effects (see John et al., 2012) or practices that push
estimated effects toward the null (such as using unusually noisy
dependent variables), then the meta-analysis estimate will be
correspondingly biased.
Example 1 (The Effect of Priming Asian Identity on Delay of Gratifi-
cation). In an experiment conducted with Asian–American under-
graduate students, Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland (2010) tested
whethermaking salient participants’ Asian identity increased their
willingness to delay gratification. Participants in the treatment
group (n = 37) were asked to fill out a questionnaire that asked
about their family background. Participants in the control group
(n = 34) were asked instead to fill out a questionnaire unrelated
to family background. In both groups, after filling out the ques-
tionnaire, participants made a series of choices between a smaller
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(Pre-experimental) rejection ratios for various Type I errors and powers.
Average power β¯ 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.0 0.01 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.0
Type I error α 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Rejection ratio Rpre 1 5 10 15 20 1 25 50 75 100amount of money to be received sooner (either today or in 1 week)
and a larger amount ofmoney to be received later (either in 1week
or in 2 weeks). The research question was how often participants
in the treatment group made the patient choice relative to partici-
pants in the control group.
What was the pre-experimental rejection ratio Rpre for this
experiment?3 A conservative anticipated effect size may be
d = 0.26, where ‘Cohen’s d’ is the difference in means across
treatment groups in standard-deviation units (a common effect-
size measure for meta-analyses in psychology). This value was the
average effect size reported in a meta-analysis of explicit semantic
priming effects (Lucas, 2000), such as the effect of seeing the
word ‘doctor’ on the speed of subsequent judgments about the
conceptually related word ‘nurse.’ Given that hypothetical effect
size and the actual sample sizes, the power of the experiment was
0.19. Thus Rpre was only 0.190.05 = 3.8.
What rejection ratio should be considered acceptable? One
answer is implicit in the conventions for significance threshold
(0.05) and acceptable power (0.80). In that case, the rejection ratio
is 16 : 1. While choosing a threshold for an ‘acceptable’ rejection
ratio is somewhat arbitrary, to maintain continuity with existing
conventions, we will adopt a threshold of 16 : 1 for ordinary
circumstances (but wewill discuss circumstances when a different
threshold is warranted in the next subsection).
Planned sample sizes should be sufficient to ensure an adequate
rejection ratio. If the rejection ratio of the planned experiment is
too small, then the experiment is notworth running because even a
statistically significant finding does not providemuch information.
The directive to plan for a rejection ratio of 16 : 1 will often be
equivalent to the usual directive to plan for 80% power.
Unfortunately, current norms in many sciences often lead to
much less than 80% power. Indeed, low power appears to be a
problem in a range of disciplines, including psychology (Cohen,
1962, 1988; Vankov, Bowers, & Munafò, 2014), neuroscience
(Button et al., 2013), and experimental economics (Zhang &
Ortmann, 2013). To illustrate, we use Richard, Bond, and Stokes-
Zoota’s (2003) review of meta-analyses across a wide range of
research topics in social psychology. Averaged across research
areas, they estimate a ‘typical’ effect size of r = 0.21, where r is
the Pearson product–moment correlation coefficient between the
dependent variable and a treatment indicator (another common
effect-size measure for meta-analyses in psychology). Given this
effect size, Table 2 shows statistical power and the rejection ratio
at the 0.05 significance threshold for an experiment conducted
with different sample sizes. For simplicity, we assume that
each observation is drawn from a normal distribution with unit
variance. For the control group, the mean is 0, while for the
treatment group, the mean is 0.21. We assume that the treatment
and control group each have a sample size of n.
In some areas of psychology, typical sample sizes are as small
as n = 20 participants per condition, and in many fields, typical
sample sizes are smaller than 50 per condition. Given an effect
size of r = 0.21, however, 280 participants per condition are
needed for 80% power. Of course, there are substantial differences
in typical effect sizes across research areas, and in any particular
case, the power calculations should be suited to the appropriate
anticipated effect size.
3 To be clear, while we conduct this calculation here, and post-experimental
calculations in Section 3.2 below, the authors did not report such calculations.2.2. Setting the significance threshold α
By convention, in psychological research and many other
sciences, the statistical significance threshold α is almost always
set equal to 0.05. Thinking about the pre-experimental odds sheds
light onwhy0.05 is oftennot an appropriate significance threshold,
and it provides a framework for determining a more appropriate
level for α. (While we highly recommend scientists consider
tailoring the significance threshold to reflect the prior odds, this
subsection can be skipped,without loss of continuity, by thosewho
do not want to consider prior odds.)
Recall that the pre-experimental odds depend not only on the
rejection ratio, but also the prior odds: Opre = π1π0 ×
(1−β¯)
α
.
A statistical test that has rejection ratio of 16 : 1 has pre-
experimental odds of 16 : 1 only if, prior to the experiment,H1 and
H0 were considered equally likely to be true. IfH1 has amuch lower
prior probability than H0, say the prior odds are less than 1 : 16,
then the pre-experimental odds are less than one even if p < 0.05.
In fact, since power can never exceed 100%, when the signifi-
cance threshold is 0.05, the largest possible rejection ratio is 1 :
0.05 = 20 : 1. Therefore, when α = 0.05, if the prior odds are less
than 1 : 20, the null hypothesis remainsmore likely than the alter-
native hypothesis even when the result is in the rejection region.
Example 2 (Evidence for Parapsychological Phenomena). In a con-
troversial paper, Bem (2011) presented evidence in favor of para-
psychological phenomena from 9 experiments with over 1000
participants. There have been many criticisms of this paper. Wa-
genmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, and van der Maas’ (2011) ‘Prob-
lem 2’ can be understood in terms of the pre-experimental odds
framework presented here. While it is of course highly specula-
tive to put a prior probability on the existence of parapsycho-
logical phenomena, for illustrative purposes Wagenmakers et al.
assume π1 = 10−20 (and π0 = 1 − π1). With such a skeptical
prior probability, what is the evidentiary impact of statistical sig-
nificance at the 0.05 threshold? Notmuch. Since the rejection ratio
is bounded above by 20 : 1, the pre-experimental odds can be at
most 10
−20
1−10−20
20
1 ≈ 2× 10−19.
When the prior odds are low, the significance threshold needs
to be made more stringent in order for statistical significance to
constitute convincing enough evidence against the null hypothesis.
Example 3 (Genome-Wide Association Studies). Early genomic
epidemiological studies had a low replication rate because
they were conducting hypothesis tests at standard significance
thresholds. In 2007, a very influential paper by theWellcome Trust
Case Control Consortiumproposed instead a cutoff of p < 5×10−7.
The argument for this was a pre-experimental odds argument.
Using the earlier notation, they argued that OP = 1100,000 , assumed
that (1− β¯) = 0.5, and wanted pre-experimental odds of 10 : 1 in
order to claim a discovery. Solving for α yields α = 5×10−7. Using
this criterion, the paper reported 21 genome/disease associations,
virtually all of which have been replicated.
Subsequent work tightened the significance threshold further,
and the current convention for ‘genome-wide significance’ is α =
5 × 10−8. Genome-wide association studies using this threshold
have continued to accumulate a growing number of robust findings
(Rietveld et al., 2014; Visscher, Brown, McCarthy, & Yang, 2012).
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For a fixed effect size of r = 0.21, this table shows the statistical power and rejection ratio at the 0.05 significance threshold for an experiment conducted with different
sample sizes.
Per-condition n 10 20 30 40 50 100 150 200 250 280
Power β¯ 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.44 0.57 0.68 0.76 0.80
Type I error α 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Rejection ratio Rpre 2.4 3.3 4.1 4.8 5.5 8.7 11.4 13.5 15.2 16.0Of course, adopting amore stringent significance threshold than
0.05 will mean that, for a given anticipated effect size, attaining
an adequate level of statistical power will require larger sample
sizes – perhaps much larger sample sizes. Indeed, recent genome-
wide association studies that focus on complex traits (influenced
by many genetic variants of small effect), such as height (Wood
et al., 2014), obesity (Locke et al., 2015), schizophrenia (Ripke et al.,
2014), and educational attainment (Rietveld et al., 2013), have used
sample sizes of over 100,000 individuals.
We suspect that our examples of parapsychological phenomena
and genome-wide association studies are extreme within the
realm of experimental psychology; most domains will not have
prior odds quite so stacked in favor of the null hypothesis.
Nonetheless, we also suspect that many domains of experimental
psychology should adopt significance thresholds more stringent
than 0.05 and should generally feature studies with larger sample
sizes than are currently standard.
3. The post-experimental rejection odds approach: finding the
rejection odds corresponding to the observed data
While pre-experimental rejection odds (and the pre-experi-
mental rejection ratio) are relevant prior to seeing the data, their
use after seeing the data has been rightly criticized by many (e.g.,
Lucke, 2009). After all, the pre-experimental rejection ratio for an
α = 0.05-level study might be 16 : 1, but should a researcher
report 16 : 1 regardless of whether p = 0.05 or p = 0.000001?
One of the main attractions in reporting p-values is that they
measure the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis in
a way that is data-dependent. But reliance on the p-value tempts
researchers into erroneous interpretations. For example, p = 0.01
does not mean that the observed data had a 1% chance of occurring
under the null hypothesis; the correct statement is that, under the
null hypothesis, there is a 1% chance of a test statistic as extreme
or more extreme than what was observed. And when correctly
interpreted, the p-value has some unappealing properties. For
example, it measures the likelihood that the data would be more
extreme than they were, rather than being a measure of the data
that were actually observed. The p = 0.01 also focuses exclusively
on the null hypothesis, rather than directly addressing the (usually
more interesting) question of how strongly the evidence supports
the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis.
In this section, we present the post-experimental rejection
odds. Like their pre-experimental cousin discussed in the last
section, the post-experimental odds focus on the strength of
evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to the null
hypothesis. However, the post-experimental odds are data-
dependent and have a straightforward interpretation as the
relative probability of the hypotheses given the observed data.
3.1. Post-experimental odds
The post-experimental rejection odds (also called posterior odds)
of H1 to H0 is the probability density of H1 given the data divided
by the probability density of H0 given the data. These odds are
derived via Bayes Rule analogously to the Bayesian derivation
of the pre-experimental rejection odds, except conditioning theFig. 2. The post-experimental rejection ratio (Bayes factor) is the ratio of the
probability density of θˆobs under H1 to the probability density of θˆobs under H0 .
observed data x rather than on the rejection region R. The post-
experimental odds are given by
Opost(x) = π1
π0
× m(x)
f (x | θ0)
≡ OP × Rpost(x), (4)
where Rpost(x) is the post-experimental rejection ratio (more
commonly called the Bayes factor or weighted likelihood ratio) of
H1 to H0, and
m(x) =

{θ≠θ0}
f (x | θ)π(θ)dθ (5)
is the marginal likelihood of the data under the prior π(θ) for θ
under the alternative hypothesis H1. Fig. 2 illustrates, in the same
context as in Fig. 1, observed data in the rejection region. The post-
experimental rejection ratio is the ratio of the probability density
under H1 to the probability density under H0. Clearly Rpost(x)
depends on the actual data x that is observed.
We utilize this standard Bayesian framework to discuss post-
experimental odds, but note that we will be presenting fully
frequentist and default versions of these odds – i.e., versions that
do not require specification of any prior distributions.
Example 4 (Effectiveness of An AIDS Vaccine). Gilbert et al. (2011)
reports on a study conducted in Thailand investigating the
effectiveness of a proposed vaccine for HIV. The treatment
consisted of using two previous vaccines, called Alvac and Aidsvax,
in sequence, the second as a ‘booster’ given several weeks after
the first. One interesting feature of the treatment was that neither
Alvac nor Aidsvax had exhibited any efficacy individually in
preventing HIV, so many scientists felt that the prior odds for
success were rather low. But clearly some scientists felt that the
prior odds for success were reasonable (else the study would not
have been done); in any case, to avoid this debate we focus here on
just Rpost(x), rather than on the post-experimental odds.
A total of 16,395 individuals from the general (not high-risk)
population were involved, with 74 HIV cases being reported from
the 8198 individuals receiving placebos, and 51 HIV cases reported
in the 8197 individuals receiving the treatment. The data can
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normally distributed with mean θ , with the null hypothesis of no
treatment effect mapping into H0 : θ = 0. If we consider the
alternative hypothesis to be H1 : θ > 0, z = 2.06 yields a one-
sided p-value of 0.02.
To compute the pre-experimental rejection ratio, the test was
to be done at the α = 0.05 level, so R = (1.645,∞) would
have been the rejection region for z. The researchers calculated the
power of the test to be 1−β¯ = 0.45, so Rpre = (1−β¯)/α = 9. Thus,
pre-experimentally, the rejection ratio was 9 : 1, i.e., a rejection
would be nine times more likely to arise under H1 than under H0
(assuming prior odds of 1 : 1). It is worth emphasizing again that
manymisinterpret the p-value of 0.02 here as implying 50 : 1 odds
in favor of H1, certainly not supported by the pre-experimental
rejection ratio, and even less supported by the actual data, as we
will see.
Writing it as a function of the z-statistic, the Bayes factor of H1
to H0 in this example is
Rpost(z) =
∞
0
1√
2π
e−(z−θ)2/2π(θ)dθ
1√
2π
e−(z−0)2/2
,
and depends on the choice of the prior distribution π(θ) under H1.
Here are three interesting choices of π(θ) and the resulting post-
experimental rejection odds:
• Analysis of power considerations in designing the study
suggested a ‘study team’ prior,4 utilization of which results in
Rpost(2.06) = 4.0.• The nonincreasing prior most favorable to H1 is π(θ) =
Uniform(0, 2.95), and yields Rpost(2.06) = 5.63. (It is natural
to restrict prior distributions to be nonincreasing away from the
null hypothesis, in that there was no scientific reason, based on
previous studies, to expect any biological effect whatsoever.)
• For any prior, Rpost(2.06) ≤ 8.35, the latter achieved by a prior
that places a point mass at the maximum likelihood estimator
of θ (Edwards, Lindman, & Savage, 1963).
Thus the pre-experimental rejection ratio of 9 : 1 does not
accurately represent what the data says. Odds of 4 : 1 or 5 : 1 in
favor of H1 are indicated when z = 2.06, and 9 : 1 is not possible
for any choice of the prior distribution of θ .
3.2. A simple bound on the post-experimental rejection ratio (Bayes
factor), requiring only the p-value
In this section, for continuity with the statistical literature we
draw on, we revert to using the Bayes factor language. Calculating
Bayes factors requires some statistical modeling (as illustrated in
the above example), which may be a substantial departure from
the norm in some research communities. Indeed, one reason for
the ubiquitous reporting of p-values is the simplicity therein; for
example, one need not worry about power, prior odds, or prior
distributions. We have argued strongly that consideration of these
additional features is of great importance in hypothesis testing
but we do not want the lack of such consideration to justify the
continued current practice with p-values. It would therefore be
useful to have a way of obtaining something like the Bayes factor
using only the p-value. In addition, having such a method would
enable assessing the strength of evidence fromhistorical published
studies, fromwhich it is often not possible to reconstruct power or
prior information.
Here is the key result relating the Bayes factor to the p-value:
4 This prior distribution was determined for vaccine efficacy (VE), which is the
percentage of individuals for which the vaccine prevents infection, rather than the
simpler parameter θ used in the illustration herein. The study team prior density
on VE was uniform from−20% (the vaccine could be harmful) to+60%.Result 1. Under quite general conditions, if the p-value is proper
(i.e., p(x) has a uniform distribution under the null hypothesis) and
if p ≤ 1/e ≈ 0.37, then
Rpost(x) ≤ 1−ep log p . (6)
Note that this bound depends on the data only through the
p-value (and note that the logarithm is the natural log). The bound
was first developed in Vovk (1993) under the assumption that
the distribution of p-values under the alternative is in the class of
Beta(1, b) distributions. The result was generalized by Sellke et al.
(2001), who showed that it holds under a natural assumption on
the hazard rate of the distribution under the alternative. Roughly,
the assumption (which is implicitly a condition on π(θ)) is that,
under the alternative distribution, Pr(p < 12p0 | p < p0) increases
as p0 → 0, so that the distribution of p under the alternative
concentrates more and more around 0 as one moves close to zero.
The bound was further studied in Sellke (2012), who showed it
to be accurate under the assumptions made in a wide variety of
common hypothesis-testing scenarios involving two-sided testing.
For one-sided precise hypothesis testing (e.g. H0 : θ = 0 versus
H1 : θ > 0), Sellke (2012) showed that the bound no longer need
strictly hold, but that any deviations from the bound tend to be
minor.
Although the result provides merely an upper bound on the
Bayes factor, it is nonetheless highly useful:we know that the post-
experimental rejection ratio can never be larger than this bound.
Table 3 shows the value of the Bayes factor bound for p-values
ranging from the conventional ‘suggestive significance’ threshold
of 0.1 to the ‘genome-wide significance’ thresholds mentioned in
Example 3.
An important implication of these calculations is that results
that just reach conventional levels of significance do not actually
provide very strong evidence against the null hypothesis. A p-value
of 0.05 could correspond to a post-experimental rejection ratio of
at most 2.44 : 1. A p-value of 0.01 – often considered ‘highly
significant’ – could correspond to a post-experimental rejection
ratio of at most 8.13 : 1, which falls well short of our standard
of 16 : 1.
Although we do not push it in this paper, one could argue
that the significance threshold should be chosen so that any re-
sult achieving statistical significance constitutes strong evidence
against the null hypothesis – especially since, in practice, re-
searchers are tempted to interpret significant results in this way.
In that case, the research communitymaywant to change the stan-
dard significance threshold from0.05 to 0.005, a p-value that yields
a bound on the odds that is close to 16 : 1 rejection odds. In-
terestingly, this was also the significance threshold proposed in
Johnson (2013); the reasoning therein was quite different, but it is
telling that various attempts to interpret the meaning of p-values
are converging to similar conclusions. (And as discussed above, this
threshold should be mademore stringent if the probability of H1 is
small.)
If the bound is not large, then rejecting the null hypothesis does
not strongly suggest that the alternative hypothesis is true – but
because it is an upper bound, its interpretation when it is large is
less clear. The following example illustrates.
Example 1 (Continued. The Effect of Priming Asian Identity on Delay
of Gratification). Recall from above that, for Benjamin, Choi, and
Strickland’s (2010) test of whether making salient participants’
Asian identity increased theirwillingness to delay gratification, the
pre-experimental rejection ratio was only 3.8 : 1. But given what
they found, how strong is the evidence against the null hypothesis?
M.J. Bayarri et al. / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 72 (2016) 90–103 97Table 3
Values of the Bayes factor upper bound for various values of the p-value.
p 0.1 0.05 0.01 0.005 0.001 0.0001 0.00001 5× 10−7 5× 10−8
1
−ep log(p) 1.60 2.44 8.13 13.9 52.9 400 3226 2.0× 105 2.3× 106Fig. 3. These figures show the relationship between the p-value and the reciprocal of the estimated Bayes factor, 1/Rpost , for results that were statistically significant
(p < 0.05) across a range of scientific fields. In each figure, the dashed line shows the reciprocal of the Bayes factor bound (−ep log p), which is a lower bound for the
reciprocal of the Bayes factor. The top two panels graph 1/Rpost versus the p-value for 272 epidemiological studies; 1/Rpost is estimated assuming a relative risk under the
alternative of 1.65 in the first panel and 4.48 in the second panel. The lower left panel gives the same for 50 genetic associations; 1/Rpost is estimated assuming a relative risk
under the alternative of 1.44 (the median observed across the genetic associations). The last panel graphs 1/Rpost versus p-values for 202 articles published in the journal
Ecology in 2009; 1/Rpost is estimated assuming a standardized effect size under the alternative drawn from Uniform[−6, 6]. This distribution was used in previous work
(Sellke et al., 2001), which found that Bayes factor calculations were fairly robust to alternative plausible distributions. The first three panels are Figures 1–3 from Ioannidis
(2008). The last panel is an edited version of Figure 4a from Elgersma and Green (2011); of the 308 articles included in the data for that paper, we dropped 6 articles with a
p-value greater than 0.05, and we dropped 6 additional articles with 1/Rpost greater than 5 in order to make the figure more readable.Benjamin et al. reported that participants in the treatment
group made the patient choice 87% of the time, compared with
74% of the time in the control group (t(69) = 3.43, p = 0.001).
The Bayes factor bound is thus 1−e×0.001×log(0.001) = 52.9. We can
conclude that Rpost(x) ≤ 52.9, but this, by itself, does not allow for
a strong claim of significance because it is an upper bound. Indeed,
we argue below that, in low-powered studies such as this one, the
Bayes factor bound is likely to be far too high.
In such situations, one could, of course, compute the Bayes
factor Rpost(x) explicitly (and again, this will be shown to have
complete frequentist justification). But if this cannot be done, we
argue for use of the bound as the post-experimental rejection ratio,
for two reasons.
The first reason is simply that 1/[−ep log p] is much smaller
than 1/p, so reporting the former ismuch better than just reporting
p and then misinterpreting 1/p as being the odds. The second
reason is that there is some empirical evidence that indicates
that Bayes factors frequently are reasonably close to the bounds.
In particular, Fig. 3 displays p-values versus the reciprocal of
estimated Bayes factors, 1/[Rpost ], across studies in a range ofscientific fields (these data are from Ioannidis, 2008, and Elgersma
& Green, 2011). These Bayes factors have a corresponding lower
bound equal to [−ep log p], shown as a hatched curve in all four
panels. It can be seen that many of the estimated results lie fairly
close to this lower bound.
While these empirical findings are promising, the situation for
low powered studies can be considerably worse, as shown in the
following example.
Example 5 (The Bayes Factor Bound And Power). An extreme
example5 of the difference that can arise from low power
5 Our example involves a hypothesis test about the variance of a normal
distribution, even though a hypothesis test about the mean would be much more
standard in applications. The problem with a hypothesis test about the mean of a
normal distribution, such as H0 : µ = 0 versus H1 : µ = 0.25, is that it calls for a
one-sided hypothesis test. As noted above, however, the Bayes factor bound need
not strictly hold for one-sided tests (Sellke, 2012). While a two-sided test would
be common in practical applications, it is unfair to compare such a non-optimal
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For Example 5 (a low powered test), there is a large discrepancy between the strength of evidence suggested by p and the strength of evidence implied by the Bayes factor,
but also a large discrepancy between the Bayes factor and its upper bound.
x 1.65 1.96 2.58 2.81 3.29 3.89 4.42
p 0.1 0.05 0.01 0.005 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
Rpost (x) 1.079 1.135 1.290 1.365 1.559 1.897 2.317
1/[−e p log p] 1.598 2.456 7.988 13.89 53.25 399.4 3195Table 5
In Example 5, the discrepancies between the Bayes factor and the upper bound are considerably reduced for more separated alternatives.
x 1.65 1.96 2.58 2.81 3.29 3.89 4.42
p 0.1 0.05 0.01 0.005 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
Rpost (x), σ 2 = 4 1.388 2.112 6.067 9.659 28.96 145.7 759.8
Rpost (x), σ 2 = 9 1.118 1.838 6.422 11.14 40.94 277.8 1967
Rpost (x), σ 2 = 16 0.8957 1.513 5.662 10.12 39.94 300.9 2372
1/[−e p log p] 1.598 2.456 7.988 13.89 53.25 399.4 3195alternatives is that of observing one observation X ∼ N(0, σ 2) and
testing
H0 : σ 2 = 1 versus H1 : σ 2 = 1.1.
Since the null hypothesis is the usual one, the p-value is also just
the usual one, e.g., p = 0.05 if x = 1.96.
Here, for a rejection region of the form |X | ≥ 1.96, the power
is just 0.0617, so Rpre is only 1.233. The Bayes factor (here, just the
likelihood ratio between the hypotheses), for a given x, is
Rpost(x) = (0.953)ex2/22.
Table 4 shows the huge discrepancy between the strength of
evidence suggested by p and the strength of evidence implied by
the Bayes factor, but also the large discrepancy between the Bayes
factor and 1/[−e p log p].
The situation improves considerably for higher powered
studies. In testingH0 : σ 2 = 1 versusmore ‘separated’ alternatives
– in particular the alternative values 4, 9, and 16 – for the same
critical region |X | ≥ 1.96 and observed p-value p = 0.05, the
pre-experimental rejection ratio is Rpre = 6.54, 10.27, and 12.48,
respectively, and the Bayes factors and upper bounds are much
closer, as is shown in Table 5.
3.3. The surprising frequentist/Bayesian synthesis
The post-experimental odds presented in the previous section
was derived as a Bayesian evaluation of the evidence. Surprisingly,
this Bayesian answer is also a frequentist answer. To clarify this
claim, begin by recalling the frequentist principle.
Frequentist principle: In repeated practical use of a statistical
procedure, the long-run average actual accuracy should not be
less than (and ideally should equal) the long-run average reported
accuracy.6
Here is the key result showing that the post-experimental
rejection ratio (Bayes factor) is a valid frequentist report:
frequentist procedure with the Bayes factor. The basic point of our example – that
the Bayes factor boundprovides a better approximation to the Bayes factor in higher
powered studies – would extend to testing hypotheses about the mean of a normal
distribution.
6 Note that our statement of the principle refers here to ‘repeated practical use’.
This is in contrast to stylized textbook statements, which tend to focus on the
fictional case of drawing new samples and re-running the same experiment over
and over again. AsNeymanhimself repeatedly pointed out (see, e.g., Neyman, 1977),
the realmotivation for the frequentist theory is to provide a procedure– for example,
rejecting the null hypothesis when p < 0.05 – that, if used repeatedly for different
experiments, would on average have the correct level of accuracy.Result 2. The frequentist expectations of Rpost(x) and 1/Rpost(x)
over the rejection region are
Ex[Rpost(x) | H0,R] = Rpre and
Ex[1/Rpost(x) | H∗1 ,R] = [Rpre]−1,
where H∗1 refers to the marginal alternative model with density
m(x) (defined in (5)), and the expectations are taken with respect
to the sampling distribution of x.
Proof. See Appendix.
The first identity states that, under H0, the average of the
post-experimental rejection ratios over the rejection region when
rejecting (the ‘long-run average reported accuracy’) equals the
pre-experimental rejection ratio (the ‘long-run average actual
accuracy’). Hence, the frequentist principle is satisfied: if a
frequentist reports Bayes factors, then the long-run average will
be the pre-experimental rejection ratio.
The second identity is an analogous result that holds under H1.
Whereas the pre- and post-experimental rejection ratios relate
to the relative likelihood of H1 to H0, the reciprocal of these
quantities relate to the relative likelihood of H0 to H1. This identity
states that the long-run average of the reciprocal of the post-
experimental rejection ratio will be the reciprocal of the pre-
experimental rejection ratio.
The first identity is completely frequentist, as it involves only
the density of the data under the null hypothesis. The second
identity, however, is not strictly frequentist because it involves the
marginal density of the data (i.e., averaging over all possible non-
null values of θ in addition to averaging over thedata); the long-run
average behavior ofRpost(x) if θ is not nullwould not be its behavior
averaged across values of θ , but rather its behavior under the true
value of θ . For this reason, the discussion hereafter focuses on the
first identity.
Example 4 (Continued. Effectiveness of An AIDS Vaccine). To illus-
trate the first identity in Result 2, Fig. 4 presents Rpost(z) as a func-
tion of z over the rejection region for Example 4. The value of
Rpost(z) itself ranges from 2 : 1 (for data at the boundary of the re-
jection region) to∞. The weighted average of Rpost(z) as z ranges
from 1.645 to∞ (the rejection region) is 9 : 1 (weighted with re-
spect to the density of z under the null hypothesis). If one observed
z = 1.645 (a p-value of 0.05) or the actual z = 2.06 (a p-value of
0.02), the pre-experimental rejection ratio of 9 : 1 would be an
overstatement of the actual rejection ratio; if, say, instead, z = 3
had been observed, the post-experimental rejection ratiowould be
35 : 1, much larger than the pre-experimental rejection ratio.
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The possibility that the data could generate post-experimental
rejection ratios larger or smaller than the pre-experimental
rejection ratio is a logical necessity, as according to Result 2,
the latter is an average of the former. Thus logically, the post-
experimental rejection ratios must be smaller than the pre-
experimental rejection ratio for data near the critical value of the
rejection region, with the reverse being true for data far from the
critical value.
This frequentist/Bayes equivalence also works for any compos-
ite null hypothesis that has a suitable invariance structure,7 as long
as the alternative hypothesis also shares the invariance structure.
As a simple example, it would apply to the very common case of
testing the null hypothesis that a normal mean is zero, versus the
alternative that it is not zero, when the normal model has an un-
known variance. Classical testing in this situation can be viewed as
reducing the data to consideration of the t-statistic and the non-
central t-distribution and testing whether or not the mean of this
distribution is zero. As the null hypothesis here is now simple, the
above result applies. (More generally, the equivalence follows by
reducing the data to what is called the ‘maximal invariant statistic’
for which the null hypothesis becomes simple; see Berger, Boukai,
&Wang, 1997, for this reduction in the above example, and Dass &
Berger, 2003, for the general invariance theory.)
Result 2 raises a philosophical question: How can Rpost(x) be a
frequentist procedure if it depends on a prior distribution? The answer
is that Rpost(x) defines a class of optimal frequentist procedures,
indexed by prior distributions. Each prior distribution π(θ) results
in a procedure whose post-experimental rejection ratio equals
the pre-experimental rejection ratio in expectation (and, hence,
is a valid frequentist procedure); different priors simply induce
different power characteristics.
Indeed, Rpost(x) will tend to be large if the alternative is true
and the true value of θ is where π(θ) predicts it to be. Thus, for
a frequentist, π(θ) can simply be viewed as a device to optimally
power the procedure in desired locations. Note that these locations
need not be where θ is believed to be. For instance, a common
criterion in classical design is to select a value θ1 in the alternative
that is viewed as being ‘practically different from θ0’ in magnitude,
and then designing the experiment to have significant power at
θ1. For Rpost(x), one could similarly choose the prior to be centered
around θ1 (or, indeed, to be a point mass at θ1).
The pre-experimental rejection ratio Rpre is a frequentist
rejection-ratio procedure that does not depend on the data; it
7 Here, invariance refers to a mathematical theory – concerning transformations
of data and parameters in models – that applies when the transformed model
has the same structure as the original; see Dass and Berger (2003) for the formal
definition within the context of this discussion.effectively reports Rpost(x) to be a constant (e.g., imagine the
constant line at 9 in Fig. 4). This procedure, however, is not
obtainable from any prior distribution. The reason is that it is
the uniformly worst procedure, when examined from a conditional
frequentist perspective. The intuition behind this claim can be seen
from Fig. 4. Any curve that has the right frequentist expectation is
a valid frequentist report. Curves that are decreasing in z would
be nonsensical (reporting lower rejection ratios the more extreme
the data), so the candidate curves are the nondecreasing curves.
The constant curve (i.e., the pre-experimental rejection ratio) is the
worst of this class, as itmakes no effort to distinguish between data
of different strengths of evidence.
While Result 2 shows that a frequentist is as entitled to report
Rpost(x) as to report Rpre, the logic just outlined shows that Rpost(x)
is clearly a superior frequentist report to Rpre, as it is reflective of
the strength of evidence in the actual data, rather than an average
of all possible data in the rejection region.
Example 3 (Continued. Genome-Wide Association Studies). Recall
the above example of the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consor-
tium, who explicitly calculated the pre-experimental rejection ra-
tio in order to justify their significance threshold. The article also
reported the Bayes factors, Rpost(x), for their 21 discoveries, and the
post-experimental odds Opost = OP × Rpost(x). These ranged be-
tween 110 and 10
68 for the 21 claimed associations. Thus the post-
experimental odds ranged from1 to10 againstH1 to overwhelming
odds in favor of H1; reporting these data-dependent odds seems
much preferable to always reporting 10 to 1, especially because
reporting Rpost(x) is every bit as frequentist as reporting the pre-
experimental rejection ratio.
4. Choosing the priors for the post-experimental odds
A potential objection to using the post-experimental rejection
odds is that it requires choosing priors: the prior odds π1
π0
and the
prior distribution π(θ) for θ under the alternative hypothesis. In
the previous section, we addressed philosophical objections to the
latter, and we showed that it has fully frequentist justification. In
this section,we address the practical question:which priors should
a researcher choose?
For the prior odds π1
π0
, one option is to report conclusions for a
range of plausible prior odds. Another option is to focus the analysis
entirely on the Bayes factor, without taking a stand on the prior
odds. A Bayesian reader can easily apply his or her own prior odds
to draw conclusions.
For choosing the prior distributionπ(θ), here are some options:
1. Subjective prior: When a subjective prior is available, such as
the ‘study team prior’ in the Example 4, using it is optimal. Again,
note that the resulting procedure is still a frequentist procedure
with the prior just being used to tell the procedure where high
power is desired (as discussed above).
2. Power considerations: If the experiment was designed with
power considerations in mind, use the implicit prior that was
utilized to determine power. This could be a weight function (the
same thing as a prior density, but a term preferred by frequentists)
if used to compute power, or a specified point (i.e., a prior giving
probability one to that point) if that is what was done.
3. Objective Bayes conventional priors: Discussion of these can
be found in Berger and Pericchi (2001). One popular such prior,
that applies to our testing problem, is the intrinsic prior defined
as follows:
• Let πO(θ) be a good estimation objective prior (often a
constant), with resulting posterior distribution and marginal
distribution for data x given, respectively, by
πO(θ | x) = f (x | θ)πO(θ)/mO(x),
mO(x) =

f (x | θ)πO(θ) dθ.
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π I(θ) =

πO(θ | x∗)f (x∗ | θ0) dx∗,
with x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗q) being imaginary data of the smallest
sample size q such thatmO(x∗) <∞.
π I(θ) is often available in closed form, but even if not,
computation of the resulting Bayes factor is often a straightforward
numerical exercise.
4. Empirical Bayes prior: This is found by maximizing the
numerator of Rpost(x) over some class of possible priors. Common
are the class of nonincreasing priors away from θ0 or even the class
of all priors; both were considered in Example 4.
5. p-value bound: Instead of picking a prior distribution to
calculate Rpost(x), use the generic upper bound on Rpost(x) that was
discussed in Section 3.2.
Evaluation of these methods: Any of the first three approaches
are preferable because they are logically coherent, from both a
frequentist and Bayesian perspective. Option 1 is clearly best if
either beliefs or power considerations allow for the construction of
the prior distribution or power ‘weight function’. Note that there
is no issue of ‘subjectivity’ versus ‘objectivity’ here, as this is still
a fully frequentist procedure; the prior/power-weight-function is
simply being used to ‘place your frequentist bets’ as to where the
effectwill be. (We apologize to Bayesianswhowill be offended that
we are not separately dealing with prior beliefs and ‘effect sizes’
that should enter through a utility function; we are limited by the
scope of our paper.)
Option 2 (the power approach) is the same as Option 1 if a
‘weight function’ approach to power was used. If ‘power at a point’
was done in choosing the design, one is facing boom or bust. If the
actual effect size is near the point chosen, the researcher will have
maximized post-experimental power; otherwise, one may be very
underpowered to detect the effect.
Option 3 (the intrinsic prior approach) is highly attractive if
either of the first two approaches cannot be implemented. There is
an extensive literature discussing the virtues of this approach (see
Berger & Pericchi, 2001, 2015, for discussion and other references).
The last two options above suffer from two problems. First, they
are significantly biased (in thewrongway) from both Bayesian and
frequentist perspectives. Indeed, if R¯post(x) is the answer obtained
from either approach, then
Rpost(x) < R¯post(x), Rpre < E[R¯post(x) | H0,R].
Thus, in either case, one is reporting larger rejection ratios in favor
of H1 than is supported by the data.
The (hopefully transient) appeal of using the last two ap-
proaches is that they are easy to implement – especially the
last. And the answers, even if biased in favor of the alternative
hypothesis, are so much better than p-values that their use would
significantly improve science.
In short, the practical problemof choosing the prior distribution
π(θ) is not a compelling argument against the post-experimental
odds approach. There are a range of options available, depending
on the context and the researchers’ comfort level with statistical
modeling. For example, Option 5 is simple and doable in essentially
every context, as it avoids the need to specify π(θ) altogether.
5. Post-experimental rejection ratios are immune to optional
stopping
A common practice in psychology is to ignore optional stopping
(John et al., 2012): if one is close to p = 0.05, go get more data to
try get below 0.05 (with no adjustment).Example 6 (Optional Stopping). Suppose one has p = 0.08 in
a sample of size n in testing the null hypothesis that the mean
is zero. Suppose the null hypothesis is true. And suppose it is
known that the data are drawn from a normal distribution with
known variance. If one sequentially takes up to four additional
samples of size n4 , computing the p-value (without adjustment) for
the accumulated data at each stage, an easy computation shows
that the probability of reaching p = 0.05 at one of the four
stages (at which point one would stop) is 23 . Thus, when using
p-values to assess significance, optional stopping is cheating. By
ignoring optional stopping, one has a large probability of getting
to ‘significance.’ (Indeed, if one kept on taking additional samples
and computing the p-value with no adjustment, one would be
guaranteed of reaching p = 0.05 eventually, evenwhenH0 is true.)
If one sequentially observes data x1, x2, . . . (where each xi could
be a single observation or a batch of data), a stopping rule τ is
a sequence of indicator functions τ = (τ1(x1), τ2(x1, x2), . . .)
which indicate whether or not experimentation is to be stopped
depending on the data observed so far. The only technical condition
we impose on the stopping rule is that it be proper: the probability
of stopping eventually must be one.
Example 6 (Continued. Optional Stopping). In the example, x1
would be the original data of size n and x2, . . . , x5 would be the
possible additional samples of size n/4 each. The stopping rule
would be
τ1(x1) =

1 if p(x1) < 0.05
0 otherwise,
τ2(x1, x2) =

1 if p(x1, x2) < 0.05
0 otherwise,
...
τ5(x1, . . . , x5) = 1.
An unconditional frequentist must incorporate the stopping rule
into the analysis for correct evaluation of a procedure – not doing
so is really no better than making up data. Thus, for a rejection
region R, the frequentist type I error would be α = Pr(R |
θ0, τ), the probability being takenwith respect to the stopped data
density
τk(x1, x2, . . . , xk)f (x1, x2, . . . , xk | θ0),
where k denotes the (random) stage at which one stops. Power
would be similarly defined, leading to the rejection ratioRpre, which
will depend on the stopping rule.
In contrast, it is well known (cf. Berger, 1985, and Berger &
Berry, 1988) that the Bayes factor does not depend on the stopping
rule. That is, if the stopping rule specifies stopping after observing
(x1, . . . , xk), the Bayes factor computed using the stopped data
densitywill be identical to that assuming one had a predetermined
fixed sample (x1, . . . , xk). Intuitively, even though the stopping
rule will cause some data to be especially likely to be observed – in
particular, data that causes the p-value to just cross the significance
threshold – the likelihood of observing that data is increased under
both the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis, leaving the
likelihood ratio unaffected. In the formal derivation of the result,
the factor τk(x1, x2, . . . , xk) appears in both the numerator and
denominator of the Bayes factor and therefore cancels out.
There are two consequences of this result:
1. Use of the Bayes factor gives experimenters the freedom to
employ optional stopping without penalty. (In fact, Bayes
factors can be used in the complete absence of a sampling plan,
or in situations where the analyst does not know the sampling
plan that was used.)
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as long as the Bayes factor is used to assess significance. In
particular, it is a consequence that an experimenter cannot fool
someone through use of undisclosed optional stopping.
Example 6 (Continued. Optional Stopping). Suppose the study
reports a p-value of 0.05 and no mention is made of the stopping
rule. A conventional objective Bayesian analysis will result in a
Bayes factor such as Rpost = 2. This will certainly not mislead
people into thinking the evidence for rejection is strong.
The frequentist/Bayesian duality argument from the previous
section still also holds, so that a frequentist can also report the
Bayes factor – ignoring the stopping rule – and it is a valid
frequentist report. That is, conditional on stopping within the
rejection region, the reported ratio of correct to incorrect rejection
does not depend on the stopping rule.8 This is remarkable and
seems like cheating, but it is not. (See Berger, 1985, and Berger &
Berry, 1988, for much more extensive discussion concerning this
issue.)
To be sure, a frequentist would still need to determine the
rejection region R so as to achieve desired Type I and Type II
errors and the implied (pre-experimental) rejection ratio. And if
one reads an article in which optional stopping was utilized and
not reported, one cannot be surewhat rejection regionwas actually
used, and so one cannot calculate the pre-experimental rejection
ratio. But these are minor points as long as post-experimental
rejection ratios are reported; as they donot dependon the stopping
rule, the potential to mislead is dramatically reduced.
6. Summary: our proposal for statistical hypothesis testing of
precise hypotheses
Our proposal can be boiled down to two recommendations:
report the pre-experimental rejection ratio when presenting
the experimental design, and report the post-experimental
rejection ratio when presenting the experimental results. These
recommendations can be implemented in a range of ways, from
full-fledged Bayesian inference to very minor modifications of
current practices. In this section, we flesh out the range of
possibilities for each of these recommendations, drawing on the
points discussed throughout this paper, in order from smallest to
largest deviations from current practice.
1. Report the pre-experimental rejection ratio when presenting the
experimental design. This recommendation can be carried out in any
research community that is comfortable with power calculations.
Reporting the pre-experimental rejection ratio – the ratio of power
to Type I error – is a wonderful way to summarize the expected
persuasiveness of any significant results that may come out from
the experiment.
Of course, calculating power prior to running an experiment
has long been part of recommended practice. Our emphasis is on
the usefulness of such calculations in ensuring that statistically
significant results will constitute convincing evidence. Moreover,
beyond conducting power calculations, reporting them and the
anticipated effect sizes can help ‘keep us honest’ as researchers:
knowing that we are accountable to skeptics and critically-minded
colleagues encourages us to keep our anticipated effect sizes
realistic rather than optimistic.9
8 This result does not apply to the Bayes factor bound in (6), however. That bound
assumed that the p-value is proper, which does not hold if optional stopping is
ignored in its computation.
9 Such reporting would have the additional advantage of facilitating habitual
discussion of how the observed effect sizes compared to those thatwere anticipated
and those obtained in related work. Doing so provides information about the
plausibility of the observed effect. For example, if the observed effect size is much
larger than anticipated, the researcher might be prompted to search for a potential
confound that could have generated the large effect.Moving further away from current practice inmany disciplines,
we recommend that researchers report their prior odds (for the
alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis), or a range
of reasonable prior odds.10 Research that convincingly verifies
surprising predictions of a theory is a major advance and deserves
to be more famous and better published. But when the predictions
are surprising – that is, when the prior odds in favor of the
alternative hypothesis are low – the evidence should have to be
more convincing before it is sufficient to overturn our skepticism.
That is, when the prior odds are lower, the pre-experimental
rejection ratio should be required to be higher in order for
the experimental design to be deemed appropriate. At a fixed
significance threshold of 0.05, achieving a higher pre-experimental
rejection ratio requires running a higher-powered experiment.
To further improve current practice, Type I error of 0.05
should not be a one-size-fits-all significance threshold. When a
null hypothesis has a higher prior probability, a more stringent
significance threshold should be required for rejecting it. Given the
researchers’ prior odds, the appropriate significance threshold can
be calculated easily as described in Section 2.2.
2. Report the post-experimental rejection ratio (Bayes factor) when
presenting the experimental results. After seeing the data, the
pre-experimental rejection ratio should be replaced by its post-
experimental counterpart, the Bayes factor: the likelihood of the
observed data under the alternative hypothesis relative to the
likelihood of the observed data under the null hypothesis. This
measure of the strength of the evidence has full frequentist
justification and is muchmore accurate than the pre-experimental
measure.
The simplest version of this recommendation is to report the
Bayes factor bound: 1/[−ep log(p)]. Calculating this bound is
simple because the only input is the p-value obtained from any
standard statistical test. Although it only gives an upper bound on
what a p-value means in terms of the post-experimental ratio of
correct to incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis, it is reasonably
accurate for well powered experiments. By alerting researchers
when seemingly strong evidence is actually not very compelling,
reporting of the Bayes factor bound would go far by itself in
improving interpretation of experimental results.
Even better is to calculate the actual Bayes factor, although
doing so requires some statistical modeling (as illustrated in
Example 4) and specification of a ‘prior distribution’ of the
effect size under the alternative hypothesis, π(θ). The frequentist
interpretation of π(θ) is as a ‘weight function’ that specifies where
it is desired to have high power for detection of an effect. Hence,
if power calculations were used in the experimental design, then
the effect size (or distribution of effect sizes) used for the power
calculation can be used directly as π(θ). Other possible ‘objective’
choices for π(θ) that are well developed in the statistics literature
include the intrinsic prior or an empirical Bayes prior.
In research communities in which subjective priors are
acceptable, then (as we also recommended in the context of the
pre-experimental rejection ratio) researchers should report their
prior odds, or a reasonable range, and draw conclusions in light
of both the evidence and the prior odds. Indeed, among all of
our recommendations, our ‘top pick’ would be to report results
in terms of the post-experimental odds of the hypotheses: the
product of the prior odds (which may be highly subjective) and
the Bayes factor (which is much less subjective). Researchers
10 In addition to reporting their own priors, researchers could report the priors of
other researchers. For example, it might be useful to report the results of surveying
colleagues about what results they expect from the experiment. More ambitiously,
prediction markets could be used to aggregate the beliefs of many researchers
(Dreber et al., 2015).
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prior for π(θ). Of course, to the extent possible, subjective
priors – like anticipated effect sizes more generally – should be
justified with reference to what is known about the phenomenon
under study and about related phenomena, taking into account
publication and other biases.
Many of the key parameters relevant for interpreting the
evidence – such as anticipated effect sizes, the significance
threshold, the pre-experimental rejection ratio, and the prior odds
– should be possible to set prior to running the experiment. We
therefore further recommend preregistering these parameters. As
many have argued, preregistrationwould help researchers to avoid
the hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975), not tomention any temptation
to tweak the parameters ex post, and hence would make the data
analysis more credible.11
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Appendix. Proof of Result 2
We first prove the result for the expected value under the null.
Since
f (x | H0,R) = f (x | θ0)Pr(R | H0) if x ∈ R,
and 0 otherwise, it follows that
E[Rpost(X) | H0,R] =

m(x)
f (x | θ0) f (x | H0,R)dx
= 1
Pr(R | H0)

R
m(x) dx
= 1
α

Θ

R
f (x | θ) dx

π(θ) dθ
and the result follows trivially by noting that

R
f (x | θ) dx =
1− β(θ).
Under the alternative, we consider the testing of H0 : X ∼ f (x |
θ0) vs. H∗1 : X ∼ m(x), so now
f (x | H∗1 ,R) =
f (x | H∗1 )
Pr(R | H∗1 )
= m(x)
R
m(x) dx
if x ∈ R,
and 0 otherwise; now, as shown above

R
m(x) dx = 1− β¯ , so that
E[1/Rpost(x) | H∗1 ,R] =
1
1− β

R
1
Rpost(x)
m(x) dx
= 1
1− β

R
f (x | θ0) dx
which gives the desired result.
11 Many versions of preregistration have been proposed, ranging from researcher-
initiated pre-analysis plans that may be deviated from (e.g., Olken, 2015), to
journal-enforced preregistration of experimental designs that are peer-reviewed
prior to running the experiment (e.g., Chambers, Feredoes, Muthukumaraswamy, &
Etchells, 2014). There have also been many thoughtful criticisms of preregistration
requirements that may be too rigid or too onerous (e.g., Coffman & Niederle, 2015).
Addressing what form preregistration should take and how strictly it should be
required or enforced is beyond the scope of this paper.References
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